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NOTES
THE REACH OF 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3):
SEX DISCRIMINATION AS A GAUGE
N 1971 THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HELD in Griffin v. Breck-
enridge' that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)2 could be used against private citi-
zens who conspired to deprive others of their civil rights. The Supreme
Court found that Congress had originally intended for the statute to
reach the actions of private citizens, 3 and that Congress had the author-
ity to reach such activity under the thirteenth amendment and the con-
stitutionally protected right to travel.4 In so holding, however, the
Court offered no indication of how future claims arising under the stat-
ute would be adjudicated in fact situations unlike the unique one en-
countered in Griffin v. Breckenridge.5 Since the Supreme Court has
not chosen to hear a section 1985(3) case since Griffin, it has been up
to the lower federal courts to fashion answers to the many significant
questions concerning the operation of the statute left unanswered by
the Court. Some of these unanswered questions go to the heart of the
statute, for example: Who can conspire in a civil conspiracy?6  What is
the requisite intent for a section 1985(3) action?7 Does Congress have
the power under section 1985(3) to reach private conspiracies unlike
the racially motivated one encountered in Griffin v. Breckenridge?"
This Note will examine how the federal courts have answered the
questions left unresolved by the Supreme Court in Griffin, with particu-
lar emphasis being given to the three prominent questions mentioned
above. It is hoped that by examining the boundaries of the statute, as
demarcated by the holdings of the federal courts, an effective statement
can be made concerning the potential reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
To achieve its purpose, this Note must begin with an examination of
section 1985(3) as originally enacted 9 and the subsequent interpretations
of it and its companion provisions by the Supreme Court of the post-
Reconstruction era. As further background, two earlier Warren Court
'403 U.S. 88 (1971). The incident that gave rise to the Grifin case occurred in De-
Kalb, Mississippi when Lavon and James Breckenridge, mistakenly believing that a black
man, one R. G. Grady, was a civil rights worker, forced Grady's car off the highway and
at gunpoint severely clubbed Grady and the other black occupants of the car. For a gen-
eral discussion of Griffin v. Breckenridge, see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 38, 95 (1971); 40 FOnDHAM L. REV. 635 (1972); 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 199.
1 See note 16 infra for the statutory history of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
3403 U.S. at 101. See also notes 107-10 infra and accompanying text.
4 403 U.S. at 104-07. See also notes 111-19 infra and accompanying text.
5 See note 1 supra for the facts in Griffin. See also notes 111-19 infra and accom-
panying text.
6 See notes 127-38 infra and accompanying text.
7 See notes 139-74 in fra and accompanying text.
See notes 175-222 infra and accompanying text.
See note 16 infra for the original wording of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) and its revi-
sions.
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decisions'0 must be touched upon, and a thorough exploration made of
the holding of Griffin v. Breckenridge. Then, in order to analyze the
adjudication of section 1985(3) in the federal courts since Griffin, the
statute will be broken down into the four elements of its cause of action
(as set out by the Court in Griffin) and each will be discussed individ-
ually. To provide a focus for that discussion, as well as some practical
application for this Note, the examination of these elements will be
conducted from the standpoint of a sex discrimination claimant attempt-
ing to utilize section 1985(3)."
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTs AcTS AND THE STRICT
CONSTRUCrIONIST COURT
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) has its roots in the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.12
That Act was the culmination of two earlier attempts by Congress to
enact workable civil rights legislation after the Civil War.' 3 The 1871
Act was largely the response of an empassioned Republican Congress
to the incalculable violence14 practiced by the Ku Klux Klan during the
10Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); see notes 78-98 infra and accompanying text.
u See notes 121-25 infra and accompanying text for the reasons why a sex discrimi-
nation claimant was chosen as a model.
12 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The Act was originally entitled "An Act
to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States," but became popularly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.
13 The Reconstruction Congress' first piece of civil rights legislation was the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. Section 2 of the 1866
Act contained the germ of future civil rights legislation:
That any person who, under color of any law . . . shall subject, or cause to be
subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right
secured or protected by this act . . .on account of or by reason of his color or
race . . . , shall be punished by fine . . . or imprisonment ....
Congress' second attempt was "An Act to Enforce the Right of Citizens of the United
States to Vote in the Several States of this Union, and for Other Purposes," Act of May 31,
1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (popularly known as "The Enforcement Act"). This act was
passed after the ratification of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and was con-
cerned primarily with voting rights. Sections 6 and 17 of this Act, however, were the
forerunners of Sections 2 and 1, respectively, of the Ku Klux Klan Act. The significant
difference was that the conspiracy provision of the 1870 Act, Section 6, provided only a
criminal remedy; whereas the conspiracy provision of the Ku Klux Klan Act, Section 2,
allowed for both a criminal and a civil remedy.
14 There can be no doubt that the Klan and other secret societies were guilty of
innumerable crimes, and that their secrecy was often a cloak for lawlessness and
outrages directed against the blacks and even against recalcitrant whites. Thus
Ku Klux Klan investigation of 1871 reported 153 Negroes murdered in a single
Florida county that year; over 300 murdered in parishes outside New Orleans;
bloody race riots in Mississippi and Louisiana; a reign of terror in parts of Ar-
kansas; and in Texas, "murders, robberies and outrages of all kinds." It was,
says the historian of reconstruction, Ellis P. Oberholtzer, a "reign of outrage and
crime which, all taken together, forms a record of wrong among the most hid-
eous in the history of any modern state." Not all of this could be laid at the doors
of the Klan or the White Leaguers, or even of the whites, but the evidence is con-
clusive that they were responsible for most of the violence that afflicted the South
during these turbulent years.
2 S. MORISON & H. COMMAGER, THE GROw'H OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 46 (5th ed.
1962).
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post-war period;' 5 and is generally regarded as the lineal ancestor of
most civil rights legislation in force today.'"
Is See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961); Cressman, The Unhappy History
of Civil Rights Legiskltion, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1334 (1952) for confirmation of the
effect the Klan's violence had upon the intentions of Congress.
16 Section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act was the forerunner of both 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970). Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13-14 pro-
vided in pertinent part:
That if two or more persons . . . conspire together, or go in disguise upon the
public highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose, either directly
or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal protec-
tion of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws, or for the
purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State from
giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal protection of the
laws . . . . and every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high crime,
and, upon conviction thereof . . . shall be punished by a fine not less than five
hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, with or with-
out hard labor, as the court may determine, for a period of not less than six
months nor more than six years, as the court may determine, of by both such
fine and imprisonment as the court shall determine. And if any one or more
persons engaged in any such conspiracy shall do, or cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby any person shall be injured
in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privi-
lege of a citizen of the United States, the person so injured or deprived of such
rights and privileges may have and maintain an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation of rights and privileges against any one
or more of the persons engaged in such conspiracy ....
In 1875, when Congress compiled the Revised Statutes, the criminal and civil remedies
set out in Section 2 were separately codified. The criminal conspiracy provision found
its way into two separate sections of the Revised Statutes. One was codified in REV.
STAT. § 5508, 18 Stat. 1073 (1875) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970)) [herein-
after cited as REV. STAT. § 5508 (1875)] which provided:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exer-
cised the same; or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoy-
ment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined not more than five
thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than ten years; and shall, moreover,
be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by
the Constitution or laws of the United States.
The other, REV. STAT. § 5519, 18 Stat. 1076 (1875) [hereinafter cited as REV. STAT.
§ 5519 (1875)] was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1882), see notes 47-52 infra, and accompanying text, and repealed by Act of March 4,
1909, ch. 321, § 341, 35 Stat. 1154. REV. STAT. § 5519 (1875) had provided:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose
of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory
from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal
protection of the laws; each of such persons shall be punished by a fine of not
less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment,
with or without hard labor, not less than six months nor more than six years, or
by both such fine and imprisonment.
The civil conspiracy provision of Section 2 was codified in REV. STAT. § 1980(3),
18 Stat. 349 (1875) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970)) [hereinafter cited
as REV. STAT. § 1980(3) (1875)] and provided in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . ; in any case of
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do,
1976]
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The heart of the Ku Klux Klan Act was section 2,17 which set out
criminal and civil penalties for anyone who conspired to deprive another
of his civil rights. The plain words of that section, 8 as well as the leg-
islative history of the Act itself, indicate that it was Congress' intent to
reach the violent acts of private citizens (as opposed to only the acts of
state agents) through the civil conspiracy provision in section 2 of the
Act.' 9 Yet for a hundred years after its enactment this civil conspiracy
statute was not available for use against private citizens.
Like all the Reconstruction era civil rights statutes the conspiracy
provisions of the Ku Klux Klan Act were severely emasculated by the
strict constructionism of the Supreme Court in the 1870's-1880's.2
The Court's strict interpretations of these statutes, and of the thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments they were meant to enforce, not
only altered the effect intended by Congress, but also created the con-
stitutional doctrines surrounding the fourteenth amendment to which we
adhere today.
or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned
by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
There have been some subsequent re-codifications since the 1875 Revised Statutes were
compiled - most notably the Criminal Code of 1909, 35 Stat. 1092 and the first United
States Code of 1926, 44 Stat. 462 - but they have been omitted because there have
been no substantial changes in the conspiracy provisions since 1875.
The criminal and civil remedies provided in section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act were
also separately codified in the Revised Statutes of 1875. The criminal provision was set
out in REV. STAT. § 5510, 18 Stat. 1074 (1875) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1970)) and the civil provision appeared in REV. STAT. § 1979, 18 Stat. 348 (1875)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
The 1871 Act also provided jurisdiction in the federal courts for violations of sections
1 and 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act. When the Revised Statutes were compiled these juris-
dictional provisions appeared at REV. STAT. § 563, 18 Stat. 94 (1875) (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970)) and REV. STAT. § 629, 18 Stat. 111-12 (1875) (current ver-
sions at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(1)-(2) (1970)).
For an overview of the statutory history of the early civil rights acts, see generally, 1
B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RICHTS (1970); Gress-
man, supra note 15.
,7 Relevant portions of Section 2 are set out in full at note 16 supra.
is "If two or more persons . . . go in disguise upon the highway .... " Act of April 20,
1871, ch. 22 § 2, 17 Stat. 13. As the Supreme Court itself held in 1971: "Going in dis-
guise, in particular, is in this context an activity so little associated with official action
and so commonly connected with private marauders that this clause could almost never
• . . be read to require the involvement of state officers." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 96 (1971).
'9 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99-100 (1971); notes 107-10 iufra and ac-
companying text. But see Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light
on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331, 379 (1967)
wherein the author claims that since largely the same men who drafted the fourteenth
amendment also drafted the Ku Klux Klan Act, it is inconceivable, given the fact that the
fourteenth amendment has a state action requirement, that they intended any statute
based upon that amendment to reach wholly private action. Therefore, Avins clainis, the
Ku Klux Klan Act was not an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under
the fourteenth amendment, but merely an example of poor draftsmanship.
20 Gressman, supra note 15, at 1336-37 points out that much of the confusion and
misdirected zeal of the Reconstruction Congress found its way into the drafting of the
post-war amendments and statutes, making the "loose and unprecise" language of its
legislation ripe for the alterations the strict constructionist judiciary had in mind.
[\Vol. 25:331
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With the Slaughter-House Cases21 of 1873 the Supreme Court had
its first opportunity to interpret the privileges or immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment.2 2  Since the language in some key sections
of the civil rights acts23 was based upon this important clause, the
Court's decision indirectly had a great effect upon them.
In the Slaughter-House Cases the Court rejected the argument that
the privilege of engaging in the slaughtering business was guaranteed
to Louisiana citizens by the fourteenth amendment's privileges or im-
munities clause. The Court held that such a privilege was among those
belonging to the citizens of the states, and as such, was to be protected
only by the state governments. 2 4  The Court noted that the fourteenth
amendment did not place those privileges and immunities running be-
tween the citizen and the state under the special care of the federal
government. Therefore, only those rights arising out of the individual's
relationship to the national government would be protected by the priv-
ileges or immunities clause.2 5 The Court declined to determine what
rights were placed under the special care of the federal government,
but in dicta suggested that such rights might include: the right to travel
to the nation's capital; the right to protection on the high seas and with-
in foreign territory; and the right to peaceably assemble and petition
the federal government for redress of grievances.2 6 As one commenta-
tor has pointed out, the irony of the Court's decision lies in the fact
that these singular prerogatives (somewhat euphemistically called
"rights") bore no practical relationship to the brutal violence that
accompanied post-war violations of civil rights in the South and gave
rise to the fourteenth amendment.2 7
In effect, the Court's holding in the Slaughter-House Cases reduced
the privileges or immunities clause to a nullity;2 8 and indirectly,
placed Congress' enthusiastically drawn civil rights legislation on uncer-
tain ground. This was especially true of the conspiracy sections, the
heart of the earlier acts, for they were drafted to protect "rights or
privileges granted or secured by the Constitution" 9 and "privileges
and immunities under the laws."3 0  After the Slaughter-House decision
the rights so protected were next to nonexistent.
21 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (On the ground that it was a proper subject of the
state's police power, the Court upheld a Louisiana statute that created a corporation and
conferred upon it a twenty-five year monopoly to establish stockyards and slaughter-
houses within a fixed division of New Orleans).
22 "'No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23 See, e.g., Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §§ 1, 2, 17 Stat. 13; Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, §§ 6, 17, 16 Stat. 140; Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, §§ 1, 2, 14 Stat. 27.
214 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78-79.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Gressman, supra note 15, at 1338.
21 The remark is not original. The same description was employed by the late Chief
Justice Warren. Warren, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect ard Prospect, in THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 218 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970).
2' See, e.g., Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140.
30 See, e.g., Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
19761
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Two years later, with the decision in United States v. Cruikshank,3'
the emasculation of the privileges or immunities clause was officially
extended to the civil rights legislation itself. In Cruikshank, sixteen
indictments were brought under section 6 of the 1870 Act32 alleging,
among many other things, the existence of a conspiracy to deny the
right to assemble and petition the government. In dismissing the in-
dictments, the Court applied the Slaughter-House rationale and re-
iterated that Congress could only legislate on the relationship between
the citizen and the national government. 33  To illustrate, since the in-
dictment in Cruikshank did not specify that the victims of the conspiracy
were assembling specifically for the purpose of petitioning the federal
government, the Court held the right to be one that ran between the
victims and the state (not between the victims and the federal govern-
ment), and as such, it was outside the protection of the statute and be-
yond the reach of Congress.34
Devastating as it was, Cruikshank's restriction of section 6 of the
1870 Act was not a lethal blow to the rest of Congress' civil rights
legislation. The statutes were meant to enforce the provisions of the
post-war amendments, so despite the crippling of the fourteenth amend-
ment's privileges or immunities clause, the statutes were still theoreti-
cally capable of enforcing the remaining provisions of those amend-
ments.
Just eight years35 after the decision in Cruikshank, however, the
civil rights acts became totally incapable of carrying out the intentions
of their framers when the Supreme Court handed down its decisions
in United States v. Harris38  and the Civil Rights Cases.37  It was
in these cases that the Court for the first time38 pronounced the state
31 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (the indictments in Cruikshak arose from a grisly incident
known as the "Colfax Massacre;" the incident occurred in Colfax, Louisiana when a white
sheriff and an all black posse were besieged in a courthouse by a mob that set the build-
ing afire and shot the black posse members as they were forced out by the flames).
See H. CUMMINGS & C. MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 241-46 (1937). It is interesting
to note that none of the grim facts appear in the Court's opinion dismissing the indict-
ments.
31 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140; see note 13 supro.
m 92 U.S. at 551.
31 Id. at 548-50.
35 There were at least two notable bright spots in that eight year period. In 1879
the Supreme Court decided two cases that clearly advanced the intentions of the framers
of the civil rights legislation: Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (the Court
struck down a state statute which limited jury duty to white persons on the ground that
it was contrary to the equal protection clause); and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1879) (the Court upheld section 4 of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, Act of March 1, 1875,
ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, which made it a federal offense to exclude any citizen from a
jury because of his race).
36 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
37 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
, Strong intimations of the state action doctrine had been made in Cruikshank:
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but this provision does not, any
more than the one which precedes it, and which we have just considered, add any
thing to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another.
The equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. Every re-
publican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment
[\'ol. 25:331
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action doctrine of the fourteenth amendment. This doctrine, more than
anything else, disabled the Reconstruction Congress' civil rights legisla-
tion.
The plaintiffs in the Civil Rights Cases had been denied access to
various public places (an inn, a theatre, an opera house, and a railroad
car) by the purely private actions of the owners of those establishments.
When indictments were brought against these owners under sections 1
and 2 of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, 39 the Court looked closely at these
sections and questioned Congress' authority to enact them. The Court
perceived that if Congress had the constitutional authority to enact sec-
tions 1 and 2, that authority had to come from one of the post-war
amendments. The Court held that none of those amendments empow-
ered Congress to legislate against the actions of private citizens.
According to the Supreme Court, denying someone admission to a
public inn or theatre did not subject one to servitude, or fasten upon one
a "badge of slavery"; therefore, Congress had no power under the thir-
teenth amendment to enact the disputed sections.40 This left only the
fourteenth amendment as a possible source of Congressional power.
4
'
Since the Court chose to strictly construe the fourteenth amendment,
and read the first section4 2 of the amendment as controlling over the
fifth, 43 Congress, according to the Court, had power under the fourteenth
amendment to reach only the actions of states, and not of private citi-
zens:
of this principle, if within its power. That duty was originally assumed by the
States; and it still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United
States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment guar-
antees, but no more. The power of the national government is limited to the
enforcement of this guaranty.
92 U.S. at 554-55. Other indications had appeared in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1879) and Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). But despite these earlier decisions,
and even though the decision in United States v. Harris preceded the Civil Rights Cases,
the opinion in the Civil Rights Cases has become generally recognized to have established
the state action doctrine.
" Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1, 2, 18 Stat. 355. This Act did not significantly
affect the earlier civil rights acts. The main thrust of the 1875 Act was in the public ac-
commodations provisions contained in section 1:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to
the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places
of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established
by law, applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any pre-
vious condition of servitude.
40 109 U.S. at 20-22.
41 The fifteenth amendment deals only with voting so it was not considered by tile
Court, and it was not until 1964 and the decisions of Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964) and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (both cases
involved the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) that the com-
merce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, was used to proscribe discrimination in public places
connected with interstate commerce.
42 No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
43 "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
1976]
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It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter
of the amendment. . . . [T]he last section of the amendment
invests Congress with power to enforce it by appropriate legisla-
tion. To enforce what? To enforce the prohibition. To adopt
appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such pro-
hibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them ef-
fectually null, void, and innocuous. This is the legislative
power conferred upon Congress, and this is the whole of it. It
does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects
which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide
modes of relief against State legislation, or State action, of the
kind referred to. 44
The above-quoted portion of the Court's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases
is generally credited as the Supreme Court's official endorsement of the
state action doctrine;4 5 after the Civil Rights Cases the state action,
doctrine was firmly established in the lexicon of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
In United States v. Harris,4 6 an indictment was brought under sec-
tion 5519 of the Revised Statutes47 against twenty defendants in connec-
tion with the severe beating of four black men (one of whom died). As
in the Civil Rights Cases the Court questioned Congress' power to enact
the legislation in question and examined the three post-war amendments
for possible sources of Congressional authority. The Court dismissed
the fifteenth amendment as inapplicable,48 and applied the burgeoning
state action doctrine to eliminate the fourteenth amendment as well
because section 5519 was drafted to be enforced against private per-
sons. 49  As for the thirteenth amendment, the Court conceded that
this amendment apparently could reach private action, but concluded
that the provisions of section 5519 overreached the boundaries of the
thirteenth amendment. The Harris Court held that section 5519 could
be used to punish whites for conspiring against whites as well as blacks,
and in the Court's eyes the thirteenth amendment, which only prohib-
14 109 U.S. at 110-11. It must be recalled that the expansive definitions of state
action-that later enabled the fourteenth amendment to be used so effectively in civil rights
litigation did not come about until the Warren Court era. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144 (1970); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See also Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (expansive definition given to the "under color and au-
thority of law" provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
45 See note 38 supra.
46 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
47 REV. STAT. § 5519 (1875) was originally a provision within Section 2 of the 1871 Act,
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13. See note 16 supra.
18 106 U.S. at 637.
49 As, therefore, the section of the law under consideration is directed exclu-
sively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the
State or their administration by her officers, we are clear in the opinion that it is
not warranted by any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Id. at 640.
(Vol. 25:331
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ited slavery and involuntary servitude, could not be viewed as authoriz-
ing Congress to legislate concerning white conspiracies against whites. 50
Since the Supreme Court, at the time of the Harris decision, was
following a strict severability rule that required the invalidation in toto
of an overly broad statute that could not be limited enough to be
brought within constitutional bounds,51 all of section 5519 was struck
down as unconstitutional because of the potential for unconstitutional
application in a situation involving a white versus white conspiracy.
52
After the decisions in United States v. Harris and the Civil Rights
Cases, the judicial limitation of the Reconstruction Congress' civil rights
legislation effectively came to an end.53 The strict construction the
Supreme Court had given the post-war amendments, and their enabling
statutes, had brought litigation under the statutes to a near standstill;
and due to. the Court's interpretations, the civil rights statutes held little
potential for proscribing the conduct of private citizens.
II. CASE LAW ArER THE SUPREME COURT'S EMASCULATION OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
A. The Appearance of the Rights of National Citizenship
After the Supreme Court's decisions in the Civil Rights Cases and
United States v. Harris, the only statute available to redress civil rights
violations committed by private citizens was the criminal conspiracy
statute, Revised Statutes § 5508.54  This statute had survived the strict
50 Even if the amendment is held to be directed against the action of private in-
dividuals, as well as against the action of the States and United States, the law
under consideration covers cases both within and without the provisions of the
amendment. It covers any conspiracy between two free white men against
another free white man to deprive him of any right accorded him by the laws of
the State or of the United States. A law under which two or more free white
private citizens could be punished for conspiring or going in disguise for the
purpose of depriving another free white citizen of a right accorded by the law of
the State to all classes of persons - as, for instance, the right to make a contract,
bring a suit, or give evidence - clearly cannot be authorized by the amendment
which simply prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.
Id. at 641.
51 The severability rule was adopted in United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876)
when the Court declared a statute based on the fifteenth amendment unconstitutional
because the statute could have been extended to denials of suffrage on other than racial
grounds. Thereafter, the Court was willing to disregard some language in a statute in
order to save it from unconstitutionality; but, as in Harris, the Court would not write into
a statute words of limitation that were not originally there. See generally, Stern, Separa-
bility and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARv. L. REV. 76 (1937). The
severability rule was, however, ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in 1960. United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); accord, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
52 106 U.S. at 642.
- Congress itself had the final role in dismantling the Reconstruction-era legislation
when in 1894, the year the Democrats got control of the Presidency and both houses of
Congress for the first time since before the Civil War, much of the Reconstruction Con-
gress' civil rights legislation was repealed. Act of February 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36.
11 REV. STAT. § 5508 (1875) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970)). Neither REV.
STAT. § 5510 (1875) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970)) nor REV. STAT. § 1979
(1875) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)) could have been used against private
citizens since both required state action. The civil conspiracy statute, REV. STAT. §
1980(3) (1875) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970)), was in danger for its
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constructionism of the Supreme Court because it was drafted to protect
those rights secured by federal law and the Constitution. 55  By pro-
tecting only those rights running between the individual citizen and the
national government it escaped the charge of overbreadth that section
5519 had succumbed to in United States v. Harris.56 Given the limited
opportunities for its use, section 5508 provided little protection against
civil rights violations by private citizens; but, were it not for an ob-
scure and confusing line of cases involving this statute, it is likely that
no private citizen would have been prosecuted for a civil rights violation
in the nineteenth century.
The obscure cases referred to mark one of the most curious devel-
opments in American constitutional law. In these cases the Supreme
Court recognized an odd collection of prerogatives that have come to be
known as the "rights of national citizenship." Most of the cases which
recognized these singular rights were brought under section 5508, and
like the rights themselves, had remained little more than historical
oddities until the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Guest.57
The Guest case unearthed one of the national citizenship rights, the
right to travel, and thrust it into the constitutional limelight by holding
that it could be protected from both public and private interference.
The opinion in Guest, however, did nothing to clear the fog of case law
from which the rights of national citizenship emerged. While this Note
cannot presume to steer a true course through that fog, an attempt must
be made to explore the precedents from which the rights of national citi-
zenship sprang. As discussed earlier, in the Slaughter-House Cases the
Supreme Court stated (in dicta) that certain rights were placed under
the special care of the federal government because they ran exclusively
between the individual citizen and the national government. 58 Only
these rights, the Court inferred, were eligible for protection under the
privileges or immunities clause. Chief among the rights identified in
the Slaughter-House Cases were the right to travel to the nation's capi-
tal and the right to assemble and petition the federal government. 59
Later, in Cruikshank, the Supreme Court reaffirmed (again in dicta) the
existence of a federally protected right to petition the national govern-
ment, and held that such a right could conceivably be protected from
private interference by section 6 of the 1870 Civil Rights Act.60 This
holding in Cruikshank could have marked the beginning of an expansive
constitutional life ever since the Harris Court declared its criminal twin, REV. STAT. §
5519 (1875), unconstitutional. Understandably, litigants were afraid to use it. In fact,
the pall the Harris decision cast over REV. STAT. § 1980(3) was so great that as late as
1950 it was widely considered inadvisable to even consider its use. See, e.g., Gressman,
supra note 15, at 1357 for a premature epitaph of section 1985(3) based on the Harris
decision.
51 Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
56 See notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text.
5 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
59 Id.
60 92 U.S. at 548-50. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text. For the legislative
history of section 6 of the 1870 Civil Rights Act, see note 13 supra.
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interpretation of the privileges or immunities clause. Drawing upon the
dicta in Cruikshank, such an expansive interpretation could have resulted
in a gradual recognition of more of these federally protected rights.
This expansion of the privileges or immunities clause never came to
fruition however. Cruikshank was the last case to extrapolate upon the
Slaughter-House Court's identification of privileges or immunities.
After Cruikshank, those cases that established other rights of national
citizenship, did not rely solely upon the privileges or immunities ra-
tionale developed in the dicta of the Slaughter-House and Cruikshank
decisions.
Ex parte Yarbrough5 ' was the first case after Cruikshank in which
the Supreme Court recognized another of the rights that have come to
be known as national citizenship rights. Yarbrough involved the prose-
cution of eight men under Revised Statutes §§ 5508 and 5520.2 The
eight had conspired to prevent blacks from voting in a congressional
election and in carrying out the conspiracy had badly beaten a person.
The Court, faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of sections
5508 and 5520, held that there was a constitutionally protected right to
vote in a federal election6 and that Congress had power under the nec-
essary and proper clause to protect that limited right through the enact-
ment of the two statutes.64  According to the Court, Congress' power
under the necessary and proper clause was inherent in the healthy or-
ganization of government itself. The Court said if a republican form of
government such as the United States', that relies upon the free choice
of the people to elect their representatives, is to survive, the violent
acts of private persons cannot be allowed to threaten the right to vote. 65
In effect, the Court held that Congress possessed authority attendant
to a power of self-preservation that is inherent in a republican form
of government, in tandem with its authority under the necessary and
proper clause. So empowered, Congress was authorized to enact Re-
61 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
02 REV. STAT. § 5520, 18 Stat. 1076 (1875) was a criminal statute designed to pro-
tect voting rights in federal elections.
' [T]his fifteenth article of amendment does, proprio vigore, substantially confer
on the negro the right to vote, and Congress has the power to protect and enforce
that right.
In the case of United States v. Reese, so much relied on by counsel, this court
said in regard to the Fifteenth Amendment, that "it has invested the citizens of
the United States with a new constitutional right which is within the protecting
power of Congress. That is an exemption from discrimination in the exercise of
the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
This new constitutional right was mainly designed for citizens of African descent.
The principle, however, that the protection of the exercise of this right is within
the power of Congress, is as necessary to the right of other citizens to vote as to the
colored citizen, and to the right to vote in general as to the right to be protected
against discrimination.
The exercise of the right in both instances is guaranteed by the Constitution
and should be kept free and pure by congressional enactments whenever that is
necessary.
110 U.S. at 665.
64 Id. at 658.
61 Id. at 666-67.
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vised Statutes §§ 5508 and 5520 to proscribe any private conduct that
impinged upon a citizen's right to vote in a federal election.
In later cases that drew support from Yarbrough the Supreme Court
recognized other rights of national citizenship. 6  Like Yarbrough,
these later cases identified rights that did not rest upon an express con-
stitutional provision. These later cases made no reference to the privi-
leges or immunities clause, and thus cannot accurately be said to have
identified privileges or immunities like those mentioned in the
Slaughter-House Cases. But after Yarbrough the distinction between
those rights that could accurately be called privileges or immunities
and those rights recognized in cases owing their origin to the Yarbrough
precedent became unclear.
Illustrative of the Court's subsequent merger of these rights into a
single classification is the opinion in In re Quarles.67  In Quarles the
Court held that a United States citizen had a right to inform a federal
marshall of a violation of federal law. The Quarles Court's discussion
grouped Cruikshank and Yarbrough together and stated that the two
cases recognized the same types of rights.68 Significantly, no discus-
sion of the privileges or immunities clause appeared in the Court's
opinion.
Today, the distinction is apparently academic. The Supreme Court
has on at least three occasions grouped all of the cases discussed above
into one indiscernible category: simply, the cases that established
"rights of national citizenship."6 9  While such a gloss does make this
area more tidy, the modern litigant who attempts to utilize one of these
curious prerogatives cannot be sure of the exact nature or origin of
these rights. Practically speaking, however, the important thing to note
is that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held Congress can protect these
rights from interference by private citizens.
B. United States v. Waddell
One of the more interesting cases that has been credited with es-
tablishing a right of national citizenship, United States v. Waddell,
70
deserves separate consideration. In Waddell the Supreme Court relied
upon the reasoning employed in Ex parte Yarbrough to allow section
5508. to reach a conspiracy designed to interfere with one Burrell Lind-
sey's rights under the Homestead Act.7' Lindsey was forceably driven
6 See United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915) (the right to have your vote
counted in a national election); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895) (the right to inform
federal marshalls of violations of federal law); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892)
(the right to be safe from attack while in the custody of a United States marshall).
- 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
68 Id. at 535.
6 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971); United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 757-60 n.17 (1966); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
70 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
71 REV. STAT. §§ 2289-91, 18 Stat. 422 (1895). Under these statutes a person could
acquire fee simple title to land by building a house and making other improvements on
the land, residing there for five years, and paying all the fees necessary to the issuance of
title.
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off land he was attempting to homestead and he brought suit under sec-
tion 5508 against those who had driven him off. Since the statute clearly
stated that a violation occurred when "two or more persons conspire to
injure or oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution
or laws of the United States . . . ,",72 the government argued that the
defendant's interference with Lindsey's homesteading rights (rights
granted to him by a constitutionally valid federal statute) 73 constituted
an actionable violation of section 5508. The Supreme Court agreed,
and relied exclusively on Ex parte Yarbrough in upholding the conviction
of Lindsey's assailants.7 4 The Court quoted the Yarbrough opinion when
it identified the source of Congress' authority to use section 5508 to
protect homesteading rights:
[Tihe power arises out of the circumstance that the function in
which the party is engaged, or the right which he is about to
exercise, is dependent on the laws of the United States. In both
of these cases it is the duty of that government to see that he may
exercise this right freely, and to protect him from violence while
so doing, or on account of so doing.
75
While the Waddell Court did not specifically mention the necessary and
proper clause, the Court's exclusive reliance on Yarbrough in its identifi-
cation of congressional power indicates that the Yarbrough interpretation
of Congress' power to enact section 5508 - as derived from the neces-
sary and proper clause .read in conjunction with a republican govern-
ment's inherent power of self-preservation - was employed.
The significance of Waddell is easy to overlook. Initially the case
appears only to provide protection of a citizen's right to homestead.
76
Upon a closer examination of the language in the decision, however,
it is apparent that the Supreme Court was granting section 5508 protec-
tion to any rights expressly secured by federal statute.77 Waddell is
72 REV. STAT. § 5508 (1875).
73 According to the Court, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, which provdes that: "[Congress
shall have the power] to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property of the United States" authorized Congress' enactment of
the Homestead Acts. 112 U.S. at 79.
N 112 U.S. at 79-80.
7 112 U.S. at 80 (incorrectly quoting Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884)).
76 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) in which the Court inaccurately
cited the right protected by Waddell as only a right to enter public lands.
7 The protection of this section [REV. STAT. § 5508 (1875)] extends to no other
right, to no right or privilege dependent on a law or laws of the State. Its object
is to guarantee safety and protection to persons in the exercise of rights dependent
on the laws of the United States, including, of course, the Constitution and treaties
as well as statutes, and it does not, in this section at least, design to protect any
other rights.
Whenever the acts complained of are of a character to prevent this [the ex-
ercise of a statutory right], or throw obstruction in the way of exercising this
right, and for the purpose and with intent to prevent it, or to injure or oppress a
person because he has exercised it, then, because it is a right asserted under the
law of the United States and granted by that law, those acts come within the
1976]
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the only case in which the Supreme Court has adopted this broad ap-
proach. Other cases in which the Court relied upon Yarbrough's in-
terpretation of Congress' power to provide section 5508 protection
involved only indistinct rights implied by the Constitution. If the
Yarbrough interpretation of Congress' power to enact Revised Statute
§ 5508 is correct, it would seem that employment of this interpretation
in Waddell to protect an express right is even more convincing than its
employment in other cases that protected obscure and indefinite rights
not expressly granted by a statute or the Constitution. However
anomalous the Court's holding in Waddell therefore, given the Yarbrough
precedent, it is quite correct.
1II. Griffin v. Breckenridge AND THE REVITALIZATION OF THE
CIVIL REMEDY FOR PRIVATE CONSPIRACIES
Not until 1971, fully one hundred years after the passage of the Ku
Klux Klan Act, did 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the civil conspiracy statute,
provide a remedy for a civil rights violation. The revival of this statute,
however, was not an isolated event; it was part of the Warren Court's
broad new view of the Reconstruction era legislation. Little can be
added here to the material written on the Court's gradual adoption of
this view, but two of the major developments need to be examined in
order to better understand the Court's choice in Griffin v. Breckenridge
of the thirteenth amendment and the right to travel as sources for
Congress' power to proscribe the acts of private citizens.
A. Prelude to Griffin
1. United States v. Guest: Private Action and the Right to Travel
United States v. Guest78 was a companion case to United States v.
Price.79  Both cases involved 18 U.S.C. § 241 and in both the Court
affirmed its intention to have section 241 reach deprivations of any right
or privilege secured by the laws or Constitution of the United States,
80
including the fourteenth amendment.8 1 Like Price, the Guest decision,
written by Justice Stewart, affirmed the state action requirement of the
fourteenth amendment.8 2 Unlike Price, the Guest decision recognized
purview of the statute and of the constitutional power of Congress to make such
statute.
112 U.S. at 79-80. A reading such as this, that would allow REV. STAT. § 5508 (1875)
to protect rights granted under federal statutes, can have tremendous implications for
litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.,
526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976); notes 200-22 infra and accompanying text.
78 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
79 383 U.S. 787 (1966). The incident which gave rise to the Price decision was the
murder of three civil rights workers - Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman - by sheriff
Cecil Ray Price and seventeen others in Philadelphia, Mississippi.
80 See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800-01 (1966); United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 753 (1966).
81 Price dealt with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, whereas
Guest involved the equal protection clause.
82 383 U.S. at 755. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court explicitly confirmed this,
but because of the strange alignment of the Court - Stewart, J. writing the opinion;
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the right to travel (wholly apart from the fourteenth amendment) as
being secured against all interference - whether it be private or state;
and concluded that section 241 could be used to reach the conspiracies
of private citizens.8
3
In his dissent in Guest, Justice Harlan sharply disputed the existence
of such a constitutional right to travel;84 but the Court, while making
it abundantly clear that the right to travel is independent of the four-
teenth amendment, based the right alternatively on the commerce
clause85 and on its being a basic right under the Constitution.88 It
is significant that the Court's opinion cited Twining v. New Jersey'7
for the latter proposition. Twining listed the right to travel as one of the
old "rights of national citizenship," protected by section 241 under the
Slaughter-House dicta,88 and grouped it together with those other
peculiar rights established in Cruikshank, Yarbrough, Quarles, and
Waddell.89
To some it may have appeared that with the Guest decision the
Supreme Court had for the first time recognized a constitutional
Clark, J., joined by Black and Fortas, JJ., concurring; Harlan, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part; and Brennan J., joined by Warren, C. J., and Douglas, J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part - two separate concurring opinions appeared in which six of
the Justies indicated that the fourteenth amendment could be the constitutional base
whereby section 241 was authorized to reach private action. That these six Justices felt
the fourteenth amendment could reach private action does not alter the fact that the
opinion of the Court in Guest affirmed a state action requirement for that amendment.
83 Id. at 759 n.17.
81 Id. at 762-74 (Harlan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85 Id. at 758-59 (citing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (depression-era
California law which prevented the free interstate passage of indigents held invalid)).
s6 383 U.S. at 758-59. The exact origin of the right to travel is open to dispute. In
Guest the Court actually avoided the issue. "Although there have been recurring dif-
ferences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right to travel,
there is no need here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right
exists." Id. at 759. In effect, the Court simply listed the precedents which had allowed
that the right to travel existed. No attempt was made in Guest to define its source. Three
years later, the Court again declined to identify the right's source, "Ve have no occasion
to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provi-
sion." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Shapiro Court did, however, refer
to three provisions of the Constitution upon which the Supreme Court had, in the past,
grounded the right to travel: the privileges and immunities clause of U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2; the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment; and the commerce
clause, U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8. One commentator has suggested there are at least three
additional distinct sources not mentioned by the Court in Shapiro: the "penumbra" of
the first amendment; the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; and the
due process clauses. Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1129, 1140-41 (1975).
It is conceivable that anyone, or perhaps all, of the provisions listed above could, in
time, be recognized by the Court as a source of the right to travel. What is significant
about the Court's opinion in United States v. Guest, and in Griffin v. Breckenridge, is
that the Court reaffirmed the right to travel's place among those rights recognized as rights
of national citizenship, and held that it could be protected against private interference.
No matter what may be ultimately decided concerning the exact origins of the right to
travel, there will always be good authority for that right's protection as a right of national
citizenship.
87 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
88 Id. at 97. For a discussion of the dicta referred to see notes 21-30 supra and ac-
companying text.
19 211 U.S. at 97.
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ground for congressional power to reach deprivations of civil rights per-
petrated by private citizens. What is often overlooked is that Guest's
holding on the right to travel was perfectly in line with that anomalous,
yet long-established, line of cases which introduced the rights of na-
tional citizenship. 90 Ironically, it was the Slaughter-House opinion, the
opinion which marked the beginning of the gradual emasculation of the
Reconstruction-era legislation, that made the Guest Court's holding pos-
sible. It was the dicta of the Slaughter-House Court that spawned the
rights of national citizenship, and it was these rights that provided the
Guest Court with additional constitutional ground on which to base
Congress' authority under section 241 to reach private action.91
2. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: Private Action
and the Thirteenth Amendment
Another of the old Reconstruction-era statutes was revived by the
Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 92 In Jones, one Joseph
Lee Jones sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1982,13 alleging the Alfred
H. Mayer Company had discriminated against him by refusing to sell
him a home in St. Louis County, Missouri. The Court held that section
1982 was a bar to all racial discrimination, public and private, in the
sale or rental of property; and that the statute was a valid exercise of
Congress' power under section two of the thirteenth amendment. 94
The seeds of the Jones decision lay, incongruously, in the dicta of
opinions like United States v. Harris and the Civil Rights Cases. It
was the Harris Court which first conceded that Congress conceivably
had power under section two of the thirteenth amendment to reach
private action;95 and it was the language of the Civil Rights Cases that
the Jones Court seized upon to support its holding on the broad reach
of the thirteenth amendment:
90 See notes 57-69 supra and accompanying text.
91 Prior to the decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge it might have been possible to view
the Court's holding on the right to travel in Guest as inconclusive since the Guest Court
also held that the actions complained of in that case were conceivably done "under color of
law." (The Court found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the acts com-
plained of constituted the requisite state action because they were ruling on a motion to
dismiss, and the indictment contained a strong enough allegation of state action to deny
the motion. 383 U.S. at 756-57.) After Griffin, however, Congress' power to reach pri-
vate action based on the right to travel was settled. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 105 (1971).
92 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
13 Originally enacted by Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted by
the Enforcement Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144, and
originally codified in REv. STAT. § 1978, 18 Stat. 348 (1875) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1970): "All Citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property."
1 392 U.S. at 413. The thirteenth amendment provides: "1. Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their juris-
diction. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
9s 106 U.S. at 640-41 (quoted at note 50 supra).
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[T]his Court recognized long ago that, whatever else they may
have encompassed, the badges and incidents of slavery - its
"burdens and disabilities" - included restraints upon "those
fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom,
namely, the same right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell
and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. '"96
The Jones decision has been criticized 97 and its full ramifications
- especially the nature of the "fundamental rights" to which the Court
will extend protection under the thirteenth amendment - have yet to be
ascertained.98 But after Jones, it appears beyond dispute that Congress
has broad powers under section two of the thirteenth amendment to
reach private, racially motivated conduct.
Without these two cases, Guest and Jones, and their identification
of two new sources for congressional authority to reach private action,
the holding in Griffin v. Breckenridge would not have been possible.
Griffin's reliance on these two decisions not only provided the Court
with a constitutional basis for its holding, but it also stirred anew the
controversies left unsettled by the Court in Jones and Guest.
B. Griffin v. Breckenridge
In reaching its historic decision to allow section 1985(3) to reach
private deprivations of civil rights, the Griffin Court faced three obstacles:
(1) the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Collins v. Hardyman99 that
imposed a state action requirement upon section 1985(3); (2) the oft-
debated question whether Congress intended for section 1985(3) to
reach private action; and (3) the further question of from what source
Congress derives its power to proscribe private action.
1. Griffin: Distinguishing Collins
In 1951 the Supreme Court held in Collins v. Hardyman that section
1985(3) could not be used to reach private action. The Collins Court
reasoned that section 1985(3) could not reach private conspiracies be-
cause private persons could not deprive others of "equal protection of
the laws" without some "manipulation of the law or its agencies."' 0
Although the Collins Court did not say so directly, apparently it found it
necessary to read a state action requirement into section 1985(3) in
order to save it from the fate of its criminal twin, Revised Statute § 5519,
96 392 U.S. at 441 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)).
9' See, e.g., Casper, lones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup.
CT. REv. 89. See generally, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 95-103(1968).
"' For a good prospective look at the potential implications of the Jones decision see
Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1294
(1969).
99 341 U.S. 651 (1951) (petitioners, members of a political group opposed to the Mar-
shall Plan, alleged that the defendants, supporters of the Plan, had forcefully broken up
petitioners' meeting in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive the petitioners of their right
to assemble).
100 Id. at 661.
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at the hands of the Harris Court. The Harris Court had held section 5519
unconstitutional because the statute, as drafted, reached private action
and the Harris Court believed a statute based on the fourteenth amend-
ment had no authority to do so. 101  Since the Collins Court felt section
1985(3) was likewise based upon the fourteenth amendment, only by
restricting section 1985(3) to those actions of the states or their agencies
could the Collins Court have upheld the statute. This, in effect, made
section 1985(3) close to a useless redundancy, since anything actionable
under that section was also actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Griffin's treatment of the Collins precedent is hardly decisive; in
fact, it is incorrect to say that Griffin overruled Collins.10 2 The Collins
Court had concerned itself only with Congress' authority under the
fourteenth amendment to enact section 1985(3), whereas the Griffin
Court determined that Congress had that authority apart from the four-
teenth amendment.0 3 Collins, therefore, may still be a viable prece-
dent in support of the contention that any section 1985(3) claim alleg-
ing a deprivation of fourteenth amendment rights requires state action.10
4
The Court in Griffin, in effect, sidestepped the Collins holding once it
had been isolated as a fourteenth amendment case.
In addition, Griffin's interpretation of "equal protection of the laws"
further distinguished it from Collins. Griffin held there was "nothing
inherent in [that] phrase that requires the action working the depriva-
tion to come from the State."105  Therefore, according to Griffin, the
equal protection language found in section 1985(3) did not limit the
statute to the protection of fourteenth amendment rights; rather, it al-
lowed protection for the "equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law
to all."10 6  But this holding in Griffin does not diminish Collins' prece-
dential value in the fourteenth amendment area, because "equal pro-
tection," as used by the Griffin Court in the sense of "equal enjoyment
of legal rights," only applies to those rights secured outside of the
fourteenth amendment. Therefore, in future actions brought under
section 1985(3) involving deprivations of rights secured by the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause, Collins v. Hardymun,
despite the intimations in Griffin, is still controlling.
2. Griffin: Congress Did Intend for Section 1985(3) to
Reach the Acts of Private Citizens
Finding congressional intent for section 1985(3)'s reach into pri-
vate matters did not pose great difficulties for the Griffin Court. On
101 See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
102 "Whether or not Collins v. Hard yman was correctly decided on its own facts is a
question with which we need not here be concerned." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 95 (1971).
103 Id. at 104-07.
104 Although they do not employ Collins as authority, this is the contention of a num-
ber of courts today. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972); notes
179-99 infra and accompanying text.
105 403 U.S. at 97.
106 Id. at 102. See notes 139-53 infra and accompanying text.
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the face of the statute alone the Court found two reasons: First, the
wording of the statute - "conspire or go in disguise on the highway,
. .- clearly manifested an intent to proscribe private conduct. 0 7
Second, reading the civil rights statutes together, section 1985(3)'s
companion provisions would make that statute a redundancy if Con-
gress had not intended for it to reach private action. 08 - Moreover,
to further reinforce its reading of Congress' intent to reach private action,
the Griffin Court delved into the legislative history of section 1985(3)109
and earlier judicial interpretations of its criminal counterparts - Revised
Statutes § 5519 and 18 U.S.C. § 241. Ironically, one of the judicial
interpretations chosen by the Griffin Court as demonstrative of Con-
gress' intent to reach private action was the very language used by the
Court in United States v. Harris to hold section 5519 unconstitutional:
In construing the exact criminal counterpart of § 1985(3), the
Court in United States v. Harris . . . . observed that the statute
was "not limited to take effect only in case [of state action],"
. . . but "was framed to protect from invasion by private per-
sons, the equal privileges and immunities under the laws, of all
persons and classes of persons," . . .110
3. Griffin: Congress Has Power, Under Both the Thirteenth
Amendment and the Right to Travel, to Proscribe Private Conduct
The most significant of the Court's obstacles in Griffin was the
identification of Congress' constitutional authority to reach private
conduct through section 1985(3). Fortunately for the Court, however,
the tailor-made facts of Griffin adapted readily to recently developed
case law making the task relatively easy. Since the plaintiffs in Griffin
were black, the Jones decision,' (with its identification of a consti-
tutional ground for reaching racially motivated action) provided the
Court with one source for congressional authority - the thirteenth
amendment.1 2  And, since the plaintiffs in Griffin were also traveling
on federal and state highways, the Guest decision,' 3 (with its identifi-
cation of a constitutional ground for reaching private conduct impinging
upon one's right to travel) provided the Court with an additional source
107 Id. at 96.
108 Id. at 98-99.
109 As an example of the framers' intentions, the Court set out the oft-quoted remark
of Representative Shellabarger who introduced the Ku Klux Klan Act: "'[T]he United
States has assumed to enforce, as against the States, and also persons, every one of the
provisions of the Constitution." Id. at 100 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
110 Id. at 97-98 (quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639, 637 (1883)). The
Harris decision itself, however, created no problems for the Court in Griffin. Not only did
Grifin establish authority outside of the fourteenth amendment for section 1985(3)'s
reach into private matters, but also the Griffin Court was not bound by the restrictive
severability rule adhered to in Harris. See note 51 supra for discussion of the severability
rule.
M 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See notes 92-98 supra and accompanying text.
it2 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1971).
113 383 U.S. 745 (1966). See notes 78-91 supra and accompanying text.
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for congressional authority. " 4 Though the fourteenth amendment was
raised in the plaintiffs' complaint, 15 the Griffin Court quite distinctly
avoided a decision concerning Congress' authority under the fourteenth
amendment to enact section 1985(3)." 6 The Court's reluctance to re-
solve this issue is troublesome because it offers little guidance for future
section 1985(3) decisions.
It is the flip-side of the constitutional authority question that is all-
important: What rights can section 1985(3) protect? For example, if
Congress had power under the thirteenth amendment to enact section
1985(3), then surely the rights secured by that amendment are eligible
for protection under the statute. Likewise, if Congress had power under
the constitutionally protected right to travel, then that right (and by
logical extension the other rights of national citizenship) is also eligible
for protection under section 1985(3). In order to gain the protection
of the statute, any other right must also be secured by a section of the
Constitution that authorizes Congress to reach into the matters of private
citizens, as opposed to matters of the states. Regretably, the Griffin
Court did not identify any other sections of the Constitution that might
secure such rights.
On its face, then, Griffin's holding on the sources of congressional
authority is greatly restrictive of the potential reach of section 1985(3).
No matter how the Court may define the "basic rights that the law
secures to all free men,"'" 7 protected under the thirteenth amendment
by the Jones decision, those thirteenth amendment rights of any conse-
quence are secured only to black citizens. White citizens have no
substantial rights under the thirteenth amendment. As for the right to
travel, the infrequency of the situations that give rise to its use alone
serves as a significant limitation.
Notably, the Griffin Court intentionally declined to offer an indica-
tion of any other permissable source for congressional power:
In identifying these two constitutional sources of congressional
power, we do not imply the absence of any other. . . .By the
same token, since the allegations of the complaint bring this
cause of action so close to the constitutionally authorized core of
the statute, there has been no occasion here to trace out its con-
stitutionally permissible periphery.18
While the above quoted language can be read to undercut a reading of
Griffin that would necessarily restrict section 1985(3) only to the pro-
tection of the right to travel and thirteenth amendment rights," 9 the
Court's abstention on this issue, as well as its equivocal language, make
the paragraph susceptible to differing interpretations. Either opinion
14 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971).
115 Count 5 of the plaintiff's complaint is set out in full in Grifin. Id. at 90.
116 Id. at 107.
17 Id. at 105.
Il Id. at 107.
119 For one author who reads Griffin as authority for section 1985(3) to reach only
racial discrimination, see 46 TULANE L. REV. 822 (1971).
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on the issue of congressional authority, restrictive or expansive, can
claim support from the words of the Court.
In sum, the Griffin Court capitalized on a propitious fact situation
to overcome its third obstacle - Congress' constitutional authority to
reach private conduct. In so doing, the Court not only avoided the dif-
ficult fourteenth amendment questions presented by the plaintiffs' com-
plaint, but it also left the federal courts without guidance in their ad-
judication of section 1985(3) cases involving neither the right to travel
nor any thirteenth amendment rights. As can be expected, the federal
courts have not been uniform in their decisions concerning the reach of
section 1985(3), and it is into this grey area of conflicting federal court
opinions that a litigant seeking to use the statute must proceed.
IV. SECTION 1985(3) AFTER Griffin v. Breckenridge:
WHAT IS ITS REACH?
A. Sex Discrimination: A Potential Litmus Test
An exploration of the various attempts by litigants to frame causes
of action under section 1985(3) would be neither practical nor produc-
tive. Therefore, this Note will select the area of sex discrimination,
using it as a touchstone to demonstrate the problems litigants and courts
alike have experienced in utilizing the statute. The four elements of a
section 1985(3) cause of action, set out by the Griffin Court, 20 will
be examined below and an attempt will be made to determine if a
cause of action can successfully be framed under section 1985(3) for a
sex discrimination claim. In so doing, comparisons will be made to the
other areas in which litigants have attempted to use the statute. Focus-
ing in this manner on sex discrimination, it is hoped, will serve to give
the discussion some practical application, and thereby produce a better
understanding of the future of section 1985(3).
Sex discrimination was not chosen arbitrarily. In many ways, the
sex discrimination field has of late served as the center stage for civil
rights litigation: Sex discrimination litigation has most recently come the
closest to creating a new "suspect" class 21 under the analysis of the
equal protection clause; 22 has given new impetus to the irrebutable
125 403 U.S. at 102-03.
2 Under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment there are two
recognized standards of review applied to test the constitutionality of classifications
made under the authority of law - the "rational basis" test and the "strict scrutiny" test.
Those classes which the Supreme Court has deemed "suspect" receive the higher "strict
scrutiny" standard of review. Imposition of this higher test makes it close to impossible
to lawfully discriminate on the basis of a person's being a member of the class in question.
For an excellent overview of equal protection analysis under these two tests, see Note,
Decelopments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
122 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1972) (Air Force regulation which re-
quired husbands of female Air Force officers to prove that they were in fact dependent upon
their wives for support before gaining dependency benefits was declared unconstitutional).
Four Justices - Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall, J. J. - were willing to recognize
sex as a suspect classification. The Frontiero decision, however, was the high water mark
of efforts to gain "suspect" classification for sex discrimination; since that decision the
1976]
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presumption doctrine; 2 3 initiated the controversy over the existence of
an "intermediary test" for equal protection standards;'2 4 and may yet
spawn a twenty-seventh amendment to the United States Constitution.
Also, the next time the Supreme Court finds itself faced with a question
regarding the constitutional bounds of section 1985(3), it could be in
a sex discrimination case. This is because sex discrimination is an
area that demands resourcefulness from its litigants. Race discrimina-
tion has become essentially a settled field, since litigants in the area
have at their disposal a number of well mapped-out methods by which
they may secure their civil rights.125  Sex discrimination litigants, on
the other hand, do not as yet have all of these same means available
to them; therefore, they tend to be more innovative, more willing to
push existing remedies such as section 1985(3) to their constitutional
limits. It is natural then, for.any discussion concerned with the future
reach of section 1985(3) to be attentive to the area of sex discrimina-
tion.
B. The Elements of a Section 1985(3) Cause of Action
Even though the federal courts were left without guidance concern-
ing the reach of section 1985(3), the opinion in Griffin v. Brecken ridge
made the statute's adjudication somewhat simpler by setting out the
elements that comprise a cause of action under section 1985(3):
majority of the members of the Court have repeatedly affirmed their intention not to treat
sex as a "suspect" class. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Cf. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (wherein the California Supreme Court held sex to be a suspect
classification).
123 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity
leave struck down as a "conclusive presumption" concerning the physical ability of preg-
nant teachers and therefore violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment).
124 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (Idaho statute that preferred men for the
administration of estates declared unconstitutional). Since the Supreme Court in Recd
applied what appeared to be a "minimum scrutiny" or "fair and substantial basis" test
to the questioned statute, some commentators have maintained that there are in fact three
tests being applied in the equal protection area - "rational basis," "fair and substantial
basis," and "strict scrutiny." See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 HAHV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975). And
while it cannot yet be said with certainty, it appears that a majority of the Court has
endorsed the "fair and substantial basis" test's use for gender-based classifications. See
Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976) (Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2%
beer to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 18 declared unconstitu-
tional). Finally, there is the possibility that yet another test is being applied in the equal
protection area for classifications that discriminate in favor of women. See Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (Navy's mandatory discharge policy that was more favor-
able towards women upheld); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Florida tax exemption
made available only for widows upheld).
125 Not only has race been a "suspect" class since Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), but also, since Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), race dis-
crimination litigants have had the older revitalized civil rights statutes such as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982 (1970) at their disposal. Additionally, there is the more recent Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
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To come within the legislation a complaint must allege that the
defendants did (1) "conspire or go in disguise on the highway or
on the premises of another" (2) "for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immuni-
ties under the laws." It must then assert that one or more of
the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, "any act in further-
ance of the object of [the] conspiracy," whereby another was
(4a)° "injured in his person or property" or (4b) "deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States.'
26
In order to delineate the reach of section 1985(3) and determine if the
statute can be used for a sex discrimination claim, one is tempted to look
immediately to element (4) and deal at length with the question of what
rights Congress has the constitutional power to protect with section
1985(3). But such an approach overlooks the fact that all of the ele-
ments must be present in order for a section 1985(3) cause of action to
be successful. If a court determines the absence of any of the four, a
section 1985(3) claim will be dismissed. Because of this, some courts
are finding it unnecessary to even reach the fourth element; while
others have been reaching it needlessly. Admittedly, elements (2) and
(4) impose the most serious limitations upon the statute; but elements
(1) and (3) do deserve comment.
1. Elements (1) and (3) of a Section 1985(3) Cause of Action
(1) [Two or more persons] "conspire or go in disguise
upon the premises of another.'
127
(3) [The conspirators] did, or caused to be done, "any act
in furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy," whereby an-
other was [injured or deprived].
Elements (1) and (3) can conveniently be treated together since they
deal less with the substantive components of the cause of action, and must
always be satisfied in the same manner regardless of what rights the
statute is being used to protect.
Read together, these two elements require a conspiracy, an overt
act done in furtherance of that conspiracy, 2 and sufficient causation
126 403 U.S. at 102-03.
127 As the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act indicates, this language was
chosen with the activities of the Klan specifically in mind, and today it has a somewhat
anachronistic sound.
121 It has generally been accepted that a plaintiff is required to merely allege overt
acts, and not specific times, dates, or meeting places in order to state a claim under
section 1985(3). Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1975). See also
Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408 (2d Cir. 1975). A plaintiff must take care,
however, that his complaint is sufficiently detailed to prevent its being labelled too con-
clusionary. See, e.g., Allen v. Lovejoy, 406 F. Supp. 359, 362 (W.D. Tenn. 1975). See also
Weathers v. Ebert, 505 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1480 (1976);
Graf v. Barker, 409 F. Supp. 571, 575 (E. D. Wis. 1976); Alex v. Allen, 409 F. Supp. 379,
382 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Davis v. Sprouse, 405 F. Supp. 45, 46-47 (E.D. Va. 1975).
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between the overt act and the particular injury or deprivation of which
the plaintiff complains. 129  Although for the most part the federal
courts have had little difficulty applying these two elements, there has
been at least one noteworthy inconsistency. Some courts, either by over-
sight or through ignorance, have not considered whether there are enough
conspirators to form a conspiracy.
Although the statute requires only two persons to constitute a con-
spiracy, in the contemplation of the law there are situations that involve
many different people, but only one "person" for legal purposes. Under
general principles of agency for example, legally only one "person" has
acted when a business entity and its agents or employees commit a tort.
The majority of the courts that have addressed this issue in a section
1985(3) decision have held, in accordance with agency principles, that
only one "person" - the business entity - has acted.
The majority view on this question was ably expressed by Judge (now
Justice) Stevens in Dombrowski v. Dowling:130 "If the challenged con-
duct is essentially a single act of discrimination by a single business
entity, the fact that two or more agents participated in the decision or
act itself will not normally constitute the conspiracy contemplated by
[§ 1985(3)].."' 3  Applying the analysis used in Dombrowski to a situa-
tion involving a corporation necessarily limits the possibilities of a suc-
cessful civil conspiracy suit against a corporation to a few specific situ-
ations: (1) when individual agents or employees act not in their corpo-
rate capacity but in their individual capacity, with no benefit enuring to
the corporation; (2) when a corporation is a sham corporation set up for
the purpose of carrying out the conspiracy (thereby giving a plaintiff
grounds to "pierce the corporate veil" and reach the conspirators per-
sonally); or (3) when a conspiracy involves two separate corporations. 132
Case law on these suggested situations has yet to be fully developed.
The few courts that have discussed them have usually done so in dicta;'
33
but it appears safe to say that any successful section 1985(3) action
129 In this respect, a civil conspiracy action differs markedly from the traditional crimi-
nal conspiracy action since the damages in a civil conspiracy flow not from the bare exis-
tence of a conspiracy, but from the overt acts done in furtherance of that conspiracy.
See generally Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Fitzgerald
v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 693 (D.D.C. 1974).
130 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (real estate corporation's agents held incapable of
forming a conspiracy to refuse rental space to plaintiffs).
131 Id. at 196 (emphasis added). Accord, Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 505 F.2d
181, 183 (8th Cir. 1974) (corporation held incapable of conspiring to refuse employ-
ment to plaintiff); Lattimore v. Loews Theatres, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1397, 1402 (M.l).N.C.
1975) (corporation could not conspire with its employees to deny a former employee
equal protection in the absence of an allegation that the supervisor acted outside the
scope of his employment); Jones v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 397 F. Supp. 815, 816 (E.D.
Tenn. 1974), afi'd mem., 519 F.2d 1402 (6th Cir. 1975) (company held unable to conspire
to deny plaintiff promotions and increases in pay); Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave.
Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (corporation's board of directors held
incapable of conspiring to block a lease assignment and stock transfer). Cf. Nelson Radio
& Supply Co. v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925
(1953) (corporation held incapable of conspiring under section 1 of the Sherman Act).
132 Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (a
number of corporations held to have conspired among themselves).
13' See, e.g., Cole v. University of Hartford, 391 F. Supp. 888, 892-93 (D. Conn. 1975).
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against a corporation is likely to occur in only one of the three above-
mentioned situations.
Due largely perhaps to the infrequency of its consideration,13 1 the
finer points of this issue have yet to be delineated. For example, even
if on the authority of Dombrowski v. Dowling it were accepted as set-
tled that a corporation and its agents cannot ordinarily be liable to a
civil conspiracy charge, does this necessarily hold true also for a partner-
ship? Can individual partners, or the partnership itself, be held to have
conspired with the agents or employees of the partnership? Judge
Stevens apparently did not consider this question in Dombrowski; yet his
choice of the language "a single business entity"'3 5 tempts an observation
that perhaps he gave some consideration to the question.
While the Dombrowski holding on the inability of a business entity
to conspire with itself is the majority view, it has not been unanimously
accepted. In Rackin v. University of Pittsburgh,3 6 a federal district
court refused to apply the Dombrowski rationale to a situation in
which a university was charged with having conspired to deny tenure.
The plaintiff alleged numerous instances of discrimination and the Rackin
court attempted to limit the Dombrowski holding to situations involving
"a single act of discrimination by a single business entity."137 The Rac-
kin court offered no further explanation and cited no authority for its
holding. This analysis is unpersuasive; no matter how many individual
acts were involved in the Rackin case, that does not alter the fact that
only one "person" (the University) committed the acts, and one "per-
son" cannot constitute a conspiracy. At least five other district courts
that have considered cases involving universities charged with civil
conspiracies have not agreed with the Rackin court's conclusion. 3  It
can be expected, therefore, that those courts that reach the question of
131 For a sampling of those courts that have either overlooked or ignored this issue
see Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974) (a corporation alleged
to have conspired with its employees to fire an employee because of his membership in the
Ku Klux Klan). Boreman, J., in his concurring opinion, however, noticed that the court's
opinion overlooked this issue. Id. at 508 (Boreman, J. concurring); Westberry v. Gilman
Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, vacated as moot, 507 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975) (a company, its
agents, and employees held to have conspired to fire and kill an employee because of his
anti-pollution efforts); Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1972) (a coal
company alleged to have conspired to discharge an employee due to his criticism of the
employer's employment practices); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D.
Pa. 1974) (a college, its agents, and employees held to have conspired to terminate
plaintiff's employment).
13- 459 F.2d at 196.
116 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
"' The Racki court noted that "[Plaintiff] has alleged many continuing instances of
discrimination and harassing treatment by the alleged conspirators. Her allegations com-
prise much more than 'essentially a single act of discrimination by a single business entity'
and therefore the Dombrowski decision is inapplicable." Id. at 1005-06. Accord, Jackson
v. University of Pittsburgh, 405 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (same factual situation as
Rackin).
"' Rubenstein v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 422 F. Supp. 61 (E.D.
Wis. 1976); Chambliss v. Foote, 421 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. La. 1976); Keddie v. Pennsylvania
St. Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Cole v. University of Hartford, 391 F.
Supp. 888 (D. Conn. 1975); Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 384 F. Supp. 202 (N.D.
III. 1974), afi'd oti other grounds, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
943 (1976).
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whether a business entity can be charged with a civil conspiracy are
likely to side with Judge Stevens in Dombrowski, and hold business
entities incapable of conspiring under normal circumstances.
2. Element (2) of a section 1985(3) Cause of Action
(2) "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirect-
ly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws."
This second element poses the first substantial analytical questions
encountered by a litigant attempting to frame a cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for sex discrimination. It is this element that sets
out the requisite intent that a conspirator must have in order for a con-
spiracy to be actionable under section 1985(3). According to the Su-
preme Court, this element requires that there be "some racial or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the con-
spirators' action."1 39 To understand what the Court meant by "class-
based animus," an examination must be made of the reasoning in Grif-
fill.
a. Class-based Animus Defined
As discussed earlier, 140 the Griffin Court clearly had no difficulty in
finding that Congress had intended for section 1985(3) to reach private
action. But the Court's examination of Congressional intent did not stop
there; for had Griffin held only that section 1985(3) was intended to reach
private action, unlimited possibilities would have existed for the statute's
application to traditionally state-adjudicated tort claims. Therefore, in
order to prevent the statute from becoming a "general federal tort law,"
it was necessary for the Griffin Court to delimit which private conspira-
cies Congress had intended section 1985(3) to reach. 4 ' In order to do
this, the Court again examined the legislative history of section 2 of the
Ku Klux Klan Act.142
As the Court noted, 43 section 2 was originally introduced in Con-
gress as a broad prohibition against conspiracies entered into with the
intent "to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges or immunities
of another person .... ."144 The broad language of the proposed statute,
however, was considered untractable and the bill was soon amended.
That amendment produced the final wording for section 2145 and gener-
ated the congressional debate from which the Griffin Court distilled
Congress' purported intention to establish the intent requirement for a
section 1985(3) conspiracy. Quoting Representatives Willard and Shella-
139 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
140 See notes 107-10 supra and accompanying text.
141 403 U.S. at 101-02.
142 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13; see note 16 supra.
143 403 U.S. at 100.
144 CONG. GLOBE, 42d CONG., 1st SEss. 68 (1871).
145 See note 16 supra.
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barger, the Court reasoned that the only way to prevent section 1985(3)
from applying to all tortious conspiracies, thereby begetting a federal
tort law, was to require the conspirators to have some class-based, in-
vidious motivation behind their actions.'46 The Court apparently came to
this conclusion by examining both Willard's'4 7 and Shellabarger's148 re-
marks and deducing that Congress used the phrase "equal protection" in
section 2 of the 1871 Act to mean "the equal enjoyment of rights the
law secures to all citizens." Therefore, section 2 (now 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3)) was drafted to proscribe conspiracies that aimed to deny a
citizen his co-equal status. Such conspiracies, the Court felt, would
necessarily have some "racial or otherwise class-based" motivation be-
hind them.'49
The Court's analysis of this element is not easy to follow. Perhaps
in anticipation of this difficulty, the Griffin Court attempted to further
elucidate this intent requirement by distinguishing it from the intent re-
quirements contained in sections 242150 and 1983.151 Section 242 re-
quires that there be a "specific intent" to deprive someone of a "right
made definite by decision or other rule of law";152 and section 1983's in-
tent requirement lies at almost the other end of the spectrum, requiring
instead that there be only the general intent requirement familiar to tort
law, that one intend the natural consequences of one's actions.' 53  The
146 403 U.S. at 102.
147 "[T]he essence of the crime should consist in the intent to deprive a person of the
equal protection of the laws and of equal privileges and immunities under the laws .... "
Id. at 100 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d CONG., 1st SEss. 188 (1871) (remarks of Representa-
tive Willard)).
141 [Section 2 extends] to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the
equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus
and effect of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy
equality of rights as contrasted with his and other citizens' rights, shall be within
the scope of the remedies of this section.
403 U.S. at 100 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d CONC., 1st SESS. 478 (1871) (remarks of
Representative Shellabarger)) (emphasis by Grifln Court).
149 "The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges
and immunities, means . . . .The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation
of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all." 403 U.S. at 102 (emphasis
in original).
150 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
,,42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
112 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945) (several state police officers were
charged with beating a black man to death in the course of arresting him in connection with
a tire theft). Confronted with a void-for-vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970),
the Screws Court upheld that statute by reading into it a specific intent requirement:
"[Tlhe presence of a bad purpose or evil intent alone may not be sufficient ... a re-
quirement of a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by de-
cision or other rule of law saves the Act from any charge of unconstitutionality on the
grounds of vagueness." Id. This same intent requirement has been extended to 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 (1970). United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966).
'-" Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (13 Chicago police officers broke into
petitioner's home, ransacked his house, arrested him without a warrant, held him in cus-
tody for ten hours, and subsequently released him without criminal charges being brought).
In Monroe, the Supreme Court set out the intent requirement for section 1983 actions
and compared it to that of section 242 actions:
In the Screws case we dealt with a statute that imposed criminal penalties for acts
"willfully" done. We construed that word in its setting to mean the doing of an
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section 1985(3) intent requirement actually lies somewhere between these
two. A conspirator need not specifically intend to deny someone a right
secured by law; but in contrast, it is not sufficient, standing alone, that
the conspiracy resulted in such a denial. A conspiracy, for section
1985(3) purposes, must not only result in deprivation of a secured right,
but the conspiracy must also have been motivated by some ill-will to-
wards a particular class of which the plaintiff is a member. This is the
purport of "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" being an ele-
ment of a section 1985(3) cause of action.
b. Class-based Animus Applied
On their face, the words "class-based invidiously discriminatory
animus" seem to imply that the "classes" referred to are the "suspect"
classes so familiar to equal protection analysis of legislative classifica-
tions. The Griffin Court, however, stated that equal protection, as used in
section 1985(3), has meaning apart from the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment: "The language requiring intent to deprive of
equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means . . . . The
conspiracy . . . must aim at deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights
secured by the law to all.' 54  Freed from their restrictive fourteenth
amendment connotations, the words "class-based" and "invidiously dis-
criminatory" take on broader meanings within the context of section
1985(3). The statute, therefore, has the potential of encompassing count-
less "classes" of litigants.
The Supreme Court provided no guidance in Griffin v. Breckenridge
for determining which "classes" could (or could not) avail themselves
of the statute's protection. The Court, in fact, refused to speculate on
whether discrimination against any class, other than one based upon race,
would be actionable under section 1985(3).'" Because of the Supreme
Court's equivocation, those lower courts that have heard section 1985(3)
claims since Griffin have had to rely upon their own interpretations of
act with "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." We do not think
that gloss should be placed on § 1979 [current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)]
which we have here .... § 1979 provides a civil remedy, while in the Screws case
we dealt with a criminal law .... Section 1979 should be read against the back-
ground of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions.
Id. (citation omitted). In order to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), therefore, one need
only intend to do an act that results in a person being deprived of any right, privilege,
or immunity secured by law.
Although the Monroe Court's statement on section 1983 intent remains in force today,
there are indications that the Supreme Court could, in time, revise this intent requirement.
For example, the Court recently has announced a "discriminatory purpose" standard to be
applied to claims of discrimination under the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause. Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976) (written test given to police officer
applicants which had disproportionate adverse impact on black applicants was upheld).
Thus far, however, the Davis "discriminatory purpose" standard has been applied only to
practices that are neutral on their face but have a disproportionate impact on a definable
class.
15 403 U.S. at 102 (emphasis in the original).
15 403 U.S. at 102 n.9.
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"class-based animus" in their determinations of what satisfies the second
element of a section 1985(3) cause of action.
Although no circuit court has yet had occasion to rule on whether
discrimination based upon sex is the type of "class-based" discrimination
contemplated by the Supreme Court in Grifin,5 6 it is safe to assume that
a conspiracy designed to discriminate against someone on the basis of
sex satisfies the requisite motivation for an actionable section 1985(3)
conspiracy.1 57  This assumption is supportable by the few district court
opinions that have so held and by a cursory examination of the holdings
within the circuits on other types of actionable discriminatory animus.
First, only three district court cases can be accurately said to have held
that private conspiracies motivated by sexual bias are sufficiently class-
based to come within section 1985(3). In two of them, Reichardt v.
Payne15  and Stern v. Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Insurance Co., 159
the female plaintiffs alleged that they had been discriminated against
in purchasing disability insurance policies;160 and in both cases the court
directly held that sex discrimination was class-based within the purview
of the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin.'6' In the third case, Pendrall
v. Chatham College,'6 2 while the court held that section 1985(3) can
support a cause of action for sex discrimination, 63 the court did not spe-
cifically address the issue of whether the requisite animus of section
1985(3) was met. Similarly, there have been other cases in which the
district courts have allowed a section 1985(3) claim based upon sex dis-
crimination, but those cases have not mentioned any of the substantive
issues concerning its propriety. 64 This is but one indication of the gen-
eral acceptance among the federal courts that a claim based upon sex
discrimination unquestionably has the requisite "class-based animus" for
section 1985(3).
156 Although Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1683 (1976) and Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975)
both involved sex discrimination claims, neither court reached the issue of whether sex-
based discrimination satisfied Griffin's class-based animus requirement. See, e.g., 522 F.2d
at 408 n.16.
"-, This is not to say that sex discrimination per se is actionable under section
1985(3), but only that sex-based discrimination has the requisite "class-based invidiously
discriminatory animus" to satisfy the second element of a section 1985(3) cause of ac-
tion. In order to make the broader assumption, that sex discrimination per se is action-
able under section 1985(3), a final element - Congress' authority to proscribe against sex
discrimination - must also be satisfied. See notes 175-222 infra and accompanying text.
15" 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
15 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
'60 Representative of the plaintiff's allegations is the complaint in Reichardt which
alleged among other things: "(1) women cannot obtain coverage for as long a period of
disability as can men; (2) women must wait a longer period of time than men for benefit
payments to commence once a disability has occurred; and (3) women are subject to a
lower ceiling on monthly benefits than similarly situated men." 396 F. Supp. at 1012.
'6' Id. at 1018; 365 F. Supp. at 443.
62 386 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (female college professor alleged sexual dis-
crimination in connection with college's refusal to renew her employment contract).
'" Id. at 348.
14 See, e.g., Milner v. National School of Health Technology, 409 F. Supp. 1389
(E.). Pa. 1976); Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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Secondly, further support can be found by quickly examining the
types of discernible "classes" that, according to the circuit courts, sat-
isfy Griffin's requirement that a conspiracy's motivation be class-based.
Some of them include: members of the Jewish faith,16 5 members of a
political group, 6 members of an environmentalist group, 6 members of
a white middle-class church, 168 members of a group of employees who
filed for bankruptcy, 169 and perhaps the smallest of the recognized classes,
members of one particular family. 170  Also one circuit has held that a
section 1985(3) claimant need not even be an actual member of ally
class, that a conspiracy against one who has advocated the rights of a
particular class has sufficient class-based animus.17 1  Judging from these
varied, and sometimes quite anomalous, "classes" that have been held to
be sufficient by the circuit courts, it is inconceivable that a litigant at-
tempting to frame a cause of action under section 1985(3) could not sat-
isfy that statute's intent requirement by alleging the existence of a con-
spiracy to discriminate on the basis of sex. 172
One final thing should be mentioned about this second element.
In light of the potential, practical difficulties involved in proving that a
defendant in a section 1985(3) action has the requisite class-based ani-
mus, it is foreseeable that this element might serve to greatly restrict
the statute's future usefulness. One of the things that greatly facilitates
the use of section 1983, for example, is the ease with which its intent
requirement is proven; a section 1983 claimant need only prove that the
165 Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973). The Marlowe court
curiously did not discuss the question of animus, but the court did uphold a claim brought
under section 1985(3) that alleged religious discrimination.
116 Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976)
(class consisted of those opposed to the incumbent administration of an Indian tribe);
Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973) (class consisted of supporters of oppon-
ent to incumbent sheriff). See also Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975) (class consisted of those carrying signs critical of
President Nixon).
167 Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, vacated as moot, 507 F.2d 215
(5th Cir. 1975).
I" Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
169 McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976). See note 224 infra.
170 Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972).
171 Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (plaintiff opposed his employer's
allegedly racially discriminatory policy). Accord Pendrell v. Chatham College, 386 F.
Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (plaintiff satisfied the class-based requirement twice over,
she was a woman and an advocate of women's rights).
172 Those litigants who have attempted to demonstrate the requisite class-based
animus for section 1985(3) purposes and who have failed, have done so usually for one of
three reasons: (1) Their allegations do not assert that they are members of a discernible
enough class. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140
(6th Cir. 1973); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
930 (1973). (2) Their allegations do not assert that they have been conspired against
because of their membership in a certain class; rather, their being within a certain class
was simply coincidental to the conspiratorial action taken against them. See, e.g., Har-
rison v. Brooks, 519 F.2d 1358 (1st Cir. 1975); Arnold v. Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974); Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d
6 (4th Cir. 1972). (3) Their allegations completely neglected to assert any class whatso-
ever. See, e.g., McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1976); Ilal
v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Lesser v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1975).
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defendant instigated an action that resulted in the claimant being in some
way deprived of his rights. By contrast, prosecutions under sections 241
and 242 are greatly hampered by the specific intent requirement of those
statutes.1 73  Proving that a defendant "specifically" intended to deprive
someone of a federal right has become a very difficult burden for the
prosecution to carry in actions involving those two sections; and because
of this, few actions brought under these statutes are ultimately success-
ful. 174
Proving section 1985(3)'s intent requirement could pose similar dif-
ficulties. This would be particularly true in cases involving covert or
subtle discrimination. It should be borne in mind, therefore, that although
the federal courts have been willing to find a number of "classes" ca-
pable of satisfying Griffin's class-based motivation requirement, in some
instances, a more demanding task of proving those allegations of class-
based discrimination may lie ahead. The distinction here is between alleging
facts sufficient to assert a claim of class-based discrimination, and prov-
ing facts sufficient to uphold a finding of class-based discrimination.
And, if the problems encountered in proving intent in actions under
sections 241 and 242 offer any indication, it could be that the success
section 1985(3) litigants have had thus far in framing their allegations
may not carry over into their efforts at proving them.
3. Elements (4) and (5) of a Section 1985(3) Cause of Action
Whereby another was (4a) "injured in his person or property"
or (4b) "deprived of having and exercising any right or priv-
ilege of a citizen of the United States."
The satisfaction of this fourth element, on its face, does not pose a
serious problem for those litigants attempting to use section 1985(3) as
a remedy for sex discrimination. The bare language of this element re-
quires only that a claimant be either injured or deprived of a federal
right. 175 Only certain rights, however, will be protected under the statute;
and the determination of which rights will be so protected involves
criteria that of themselves constitute another element of a section 1985(3)
cause of action. Although not identified as such by the Supreme Court
173 See Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 175, 182-83 (1947); Fraenkel, The Federal Civil Rights Laws, 31 MINN. L. REV.
301, 311-12 (1947).
174 See Shapiro, Limitations in Prosecuting Civil Rights Violations, 46 Cor'NELL L. Q.
532 (1961). As the author points out, a prime example of this is sheriff Screws (the
named defendant in Screws v. United States) and those tried with him. They were all
acquitted in the retrial after the Supreme Court decision. Id. at 535.
175 The Supreme Court's framing of (4a) and (4b) in the disjunctive is misleading. It is
conceivable that someone may be injured pursuant to a private conspiracy that pos-
sesses the requisite intent of section 1985(3) and not be deprived of any federal rights. Ac-
cording to the language of the Griflin Court, and of the statute itself, such conspiratorial
conduct would appear to be actionable under section 1985(3), provided Congress has
the constitutional authority to proscribe such private conduct. But therein lies the prob-
lem: Congress has such constitutional authority only when a federally protected right -
such as the right to travel - is involved. Therefore, a conspiracy that merely injures
someone, without depriving the person of a federal right, is not actionable under section
1985(3); rather, the injured party's proper civil remedy lies in a common law tort action.
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in Griffin v. Breckenridge, it is apparent that such a fifth element does
exist, because the framing of a section 1985(3) cause of action is not
completed by fulfilling only the four elements listed in Griffin. Concep-
tually, there is an unspoken element that is the most crucial requirement
of a section 1985(3) cause of action: A claimant must demonstrate
that section 1985(3) has the constitutional authority to protect him from
the particular private conspiracy that he alleges. 176  Without such a
demonstration of Congress' constitutional authority to proscribe, through
its enactment of section 1985(3), the private conspiracy complained of,
the fulfillment of elements (1) through (4) can be given no effect be-
cause the statute cannot be applied unconstitutionally. In Griffin v.
Breckenridge, the Supreme Court recognized this requirement and
treated it at length,17 7 but chose not to list it as an element of a section
1985(3) cause of action. For purposes of analyzing the statute, however,
it is helpful to view this requirement separately.
In attempting to satisfy this unspoken fifth element, a litigant seek-
ing to use section 1985(3) for a sex discrimination claim faces the same
questions that confronted the Supreme Court in Griffin: From where does
Congress derive its power to reach the acts of private citizens? In Grif-
fin, the special facts of the case facilitated the Court's identification
of two sources of Congress' constitutional authority - the thirteenth
amendment and the right to travel. 178  But these two sources offer no
help to a litigant attempting to use the statute against sex discrimination.
New constitutional guarantees must be explored by such a litigant. Ac-
cordingly, in the discussion that follows, the two most likely areas upon
which a sex discrimination claimant could draw for the constitutional
authority to allow section 1985(3) to reach private conspiracies, will be
examined.
a. The Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1985(3) clearly should protect rights secured by the fourteenth
amendment. As Judge Stevens pointed out in Dombrowski v. Dowling,17 9
the title of the statute itself, as it was originally enacted,8 0 expressly
identified the fourteenth amendment as a source of Congress' author-
ity to enact the statute. But as Judge Stevens' opinion in Cohen v. Illinois
Institute of Technology s' demonstrated, recognizing that one's fourteenth
amendment rights are eligible for protection under section 1985(3) does
not help a sex discrimination claimant attempting to use section 1985(3)to
reach private conspiracies.
In Cohen, a former female assistant professor brought suit against
the Illinois Institute of Technology for its alleged sex-based discrimina-
176 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103-07 (1971).
177 Id.
17 Id. See notes 111-19 supra and accompanying text.
179 459 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1972).
IS0 The Ku Klux Klan Act, from which section 1985(3) is derived, see note 16 supra,
was originally entitled "an Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States." Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13.
181 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975).
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tion against female faculty members. The plaintiff, Dr. Cohen, alleged
that the Institute's administration had conspired to deprive her of her
fourteenth amendment right to equal protection by denying her tenure,
and she sought to establish a complaint under section 1985(3).182 Judge
Stevens, relying on his earlier opinion in Dombrowski v. Dowling,
83
held that there can be no actionable section 1985(3) violation of a per-
son's fourteenth amendment rights in the absence of state action.1
84
Stevens reasoned that since the fourteenth amendment, as presently
interpreted by the Supreme Court, is to be applied in accordance with
the state action doctrine, the rights secured by that amendment are
protected only against actions by the states. Accordingly, since Dr. Cohen
had not sufficiently alleged state action in her complaint, she could not
successfully claim that a right guaranteed to her by the fourteenth
amendment had been violated.
As long as the Supreme Court continues to adhere to the state action
doctrine, as established in United States v. Harris and the Civil Rights
Cases,'85 there can be no doubt that Stevens' holding is correct; and the
force of his argument should continue to control future determinations of
this issue within the federal courts. For the most part, those few courts
that have not agreed with Stevens' decisions in Cohen and Dombrowski
have based their conclusions upon a misreading of Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge. Illustrative of such a misreading is the court's opinion in Reichardt
v. Payne.'8 6 The plaintiff, Martha Reichardt, brought a class action
against the Insurance Commissioner of California and the Life Insurance
Company of North America (LINA) alleging that the insurance policies
sold by LINA, and approved by the Commissioner, discriminated against
women.8 7 In her complaint Ms. Reichardt alleged that both defendants
violated sections 1985(3) and 1983 by depriving her of her fourteenth
amendment right to equal protection of the laws. The Reichardt court,
in discussing the section 1985(3) claim against LINA, incorrectly in-
terpreted the part of Justice Stewart's opinion in Griffin that dealt with
the finding of congressional intent to allow section 1985(3) to reach
private action. 18  The court read Stewart's remark, that Congress in-
tended "to speak in § 1985(3) of all deprivations of 'equal protection of
the laws' and 'equal privileges and immunities under the laws', what-
ever their source,"'18 9 as a positive indication that the Supreme Court
in Griffin intended to allow the rights secured by the equal protection
1"I Id. at 827-28.
183 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972).
184 524 F.2d at 827-30.
185 See notes 35-53 supra and accompanying text.
186 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975). Two circuit courts have held that section
1985(3) has no state action requirement whatsoever. See Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522
F.2d 397, 408 (2d Cir. 1975) and Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir.
1971). Since neither of these opinions contain an adequate exposition of the court's
reasoning, the opinion in Reichardt serves to best illustrate the contra-Cohen view.
117 The significant parts of Ms. Reichardt's complaint are set out above, see note 160
supra.
188 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971).
189 Id.
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clause of the fourteenth amendment to be protected against private
conspiracies. 90 The Reichardt court, however, overlooked the fact
that the words "equal protection," as construed in section 1985(3) by the
Griffin Court, have meaning apart from the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. This is what Justice Stewart meant when
he said, in Griffin, that a century of fourteenth amendment adjudication
has made it understandably difficult to conceive of a deprivation of the
equal protection of the laws by private persons. 19' As this Note indicated
earlier, 192 the Griffin Court determined that equal protection, as used in
section 1985(3), means the "equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law
to all." 193  One of the rights so secured is the fourteenth amendment
right to the equal protection of the laws; and as Judge Stevens so ably
pointed out in both Dombrowski v. Dowling and Coheni v. Illinois isti-
tute of Technology, the right to the equal protection of the laws, like
all fourteenth amendment rights, is presently protected only from the
actions of the states, not from the actions of private citizens. 94
The only successful way to rebut Stevens' argument in Cohen, and
thereby permit a sex discrimination litigant to assert fourteenth amend-
ment rights against private citizens, is by launching a successful attack
upon that argument's major premise: the state action requirement of
the fourteenth amendment. Such an approach immediately embroils
one in a constitutional controversy that has been raging at least since
the decision in United States v. Guest. 95 It involves the very sig-
nificant question of whether Congress has power, under section five of
the fourteenth amendment, to reach private conduct; or whether as the
state action doctrine would have it, section one of that amendment,
with its admonishment "no state shall," is to .be read to require the
amendment's exclusive application to the actions of the states.
So much has been written on this question that it would be wasteful
to address it at any length here.196 Suffice it to say, the two circuit
10 396 F. Supp. at 1018.
'9' 403 U.S. at 97.
192 See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
193 403 U.S. at 102.
11 459 F.2d at 195-96; 524 F.2d at 827-30. Judge Stevens' holding in both of these
cases could have drawn support from an earlier Supreme Court case - Collins v. Hardy-
man, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). Since the Griffin Court distinctly did not overrule Collins,
choosing instead to isolate Collins' precedential value to those cases involving fourteenth
amendment rights, Collins could have been propertly cited by Stevens as authority for the
holdings in Cohen and Dombrowski. See notes 100-06 supra and accompanying text.
195 383 U.S. 745 (1966). See note 82 supra for the alignment of the Court, and the
two concurring opinions in Guest that have done so much to generate this controversy.
See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 188 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
1906 For just a sampling of the commentators who have addressed this issue see
H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); J. TENBROEK, THE
ANTI-SLAvEny ORuCINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); Avins, Federal Power to
Punish Individual Crimes Under the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding,
43 NoTm DAME LAW. 317 (1968); Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Re-
flected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth- Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J.
331 (1967); Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CINN.
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court decisions that have held that section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment will permit Congress to proscribe private conspiracies through sec-
tion 1985(3)197 have not been well received,"" and do not suggest a
trend among the federal courts. Also, theoretical constitutional argu-
ments to the side, the realities of the present make-up of the Supreme
Court do not bode well for the acceptance of such an expansive view of
the protections extended by the fourteenth amendment. 99 For now, the
sex discrimination claimant seeking to use section 1985(3) must look
elsewhere for a constitutional source upon which to base Congressional
authority to reach private conspiracies.
b. A Possibility
There have been a few indications within the federal courts which,
if extrapolated upon, could open up wide new areas for the utilization
of section 1985(3). Especially portentous is the recent Fifth Circuit
decision in McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co. 2 0 0
The plaintiff in McLellan was an employee of the Mississippi Power
& Light Co. (MPL) who was discharged because he violated MPL's
company policy against employee's filing voluntary petitions in bank-
ruptcy. After his dismissal, the plaintiff filed a section 1985(3) action
against MPL and his union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, alleging they had conspired to deny him a federally pro-
L. REV. 199 (1971); Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Foreward: Constitutional Ad-
judication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966); Frank &
Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 50 COLuM L.
REV. 131 (1950); Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1960); Gressman, supra note 15; Peters, Civil
Rights and State Non-Action, 34 NoTrE DAME LAW. 303 (1959); Note, Federal Power to
Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Recon-
struction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1974); Note, Theories of Federalism
and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007 (1966); 74 YALE L.J. 1462 (1965).
See also Note, Private Interference with an Individual's Civil Rights: A Redressable
Wrong Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 51 NoTRE DAME LAW. 120 (1975)
which compares the differing views among the circuit courts on this issue within the
context of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). The author espouses an "indirect state action"
theory that would enable Congress to invoke its section 5 powers to protect section 1
guarantees. Id. at 139. The efficacy of such an amorphous standard, however, is ques-
tionable.
' Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, vacated as moot, 507 F.2d 215
(5th Cir. 1975); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
"I See Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975); Bellamy
v. Mason's Stores Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974); Comment, Constitutional and Juris-
dictional Problems in the Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 52 B.U.L. REV. 599 (1972).
See also Note, Private Interference with an Individual's Civil Rights: A Redressable Wrong
Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 51 NoTRE DAME LAW. 120 (1975).
99 The overly sanguine predictions of some commentators, see, e.g., Note, Federal
Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the
Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 526-27 (1974), that Congress may
now have the power under section 5 to reach private discrimination overlooks the impact
of the Nixon appointees on the Supreme Court. The Court today is markedly different
from what it was when United States v. Guest was decidied. In fact, of the six Justices
in Guest who agreed that section 5 could be used to reach private action, only one,
Justice Brennan, remains on the Court today.
200 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976) (scheduled for rehearing en bane). See note 224 infra.
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tected right to file for bankruptcy.20 ' After concluding that MPL
employees desiring to file bankruptcy petitions comprised a sufficient
class for purposes of alleging the requisite class-based animus of a section
1985(3) cause of action,20 2 the McLellan court identified the com-
merce clause2°3 in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause2 0 4
as the source for Congress' authority to reach the conspiracy alleged
by the plaintiff.20 5 More specifically, the court held that the federal
bankruptcy laws secured for the plaintiff certain federal rights to file
for bankruptcy; that Congress derived its power to create those rights
from the commerce clause; and that the necessary and proper clause
allowed Congress to enact appropriate legislation to protect those bank-
ruptcy rights. The McLellan court concluded that by creating section
1985(3) to safeguard federal rights from private interference, Congress
had made the protection of federal bankruptcy rights possible.206
The Fifth Circuit claimed support from United States v. Waddell 20 7
for its interesting application of section 1985(3).211 As mentioned
earlier,2 0 9 Waddell was a criminal action brought under the predeces-
sor of 18 U.S.C. § 241210 in which a group of individuals allegedly
conspired to deprive a homesteader of his right to establish a claim
under the homestead acts. Waddell's analysis of Congress' constitu-
tional authority to reach a conspiracy against homesteading parallels
the analysis used in McLellan. The Waddell Court held Congress de-
rived power from article IV, section 3 of the Constitution to enact the
homestead laws. By applying the interpretation of Congress' power
under the necessary and proper clause that was established in Ex parte
Yarbrough,2 1' the Waddell Court further held Congress could proscribe
private conduct that interfered with homesteading rights secured by the
Homestead Acts.2 12  The Waddell precedent does, therefore, strongly
support the holding in McLellan. Moreover, the McLellan court could
have drawn additional support from the Supreme Court's holding in
201 Id. at 871. It is hard to ascertain from the circuit court's opinion exactly how
the plaintiff's complaint was framed; but from the court's reference to the plaintiff's
"inartfully drawn" complaint, id., as well as Judge Roney's comment that the issues
reached by the court were "neither briefed nor argued" before the court, id. at 883 (con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), it is possible that the McLellan court's innova-
tive approach to section 1985(3) was a complete surprise to plaintiff's counsel.
202 Id. at 875-80.
203 More specifically, the court relied upon that clause's bankruptcy provision: "The
Congress shall have power . . . . To establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of Bank-
ruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
204 "The Congress shall have Power ... to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States." Id.
205 526 F.2d at 880.
206 Id. at 880-81.
2- 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
20 526 F.2d at 881.
209 See notes 70-77 supra and accompanying text.
210 REV. STAT. § 5508 (1875).
211 110 U.S. 651 (1884). See notes 70-77 supra and accompanying text.
212 112 U.S. at 79-80.
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Griffin v. Breckenridge. It was in Griffin that the Court reiterated that
Congress could protect rights of national citizenship from private inter-
ference, and Waddell was one of the decisions the Court cited as authority
for that proposition.213 Once it is realized that the holding in Waddell
classified federal statutory rights as rights of national citizenship and
afforded those statutory rights the same protection from private inter-
ference that is given the rights of national citizenship, it becomes clear
that the McLellan decision is not an aberration. 214  The McLellan
court's holding is a valid extension of a little recognized line of cases,
tracing back to Ex parte Yarbrough, that have yet to be overruled or
even undermined.
Applying McLellan's interpretation of the reach of section 1985(3)
to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act2 1 5 holds some interesting pos-
sibilities for the sex discrimination claimant seeking to utilize the civil
conspiracy statute. Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress' authority
under the commerce clause, and the necessary and proper clause could
conceivably empower Congress to protect any rights secured by Title
VII. Therefore, if McLellan's application of section 1985(3) were to
survive scrutiny,216 a sex discrimination claimant who could allege a
violation of employment rights secured by Title VII, could sue any private
citizens who conspired to deny him those Title VII rights.
Although the McLellan rationale was not employed, this is the exact
result reached by a district court in Milner v. National School of Health
Technology. 17 The plaintiff in Milner alleged that she had been dis-
criminated against through National's policy of firing and refusing to
hire divorced women. In her section 1985(3) claim, the plaintiff alleged
that National had deprived her of rights secured by Title VII. The
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and cryptically held:
[P]laintiff asserts that her dismissal violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act 1964. That statute prohibits employment dis-
crimination on the basis of sex by private employers. There-
fore, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the deprivation of a fed-
erally protected right under § 1985(3).218
No authorities were cited by the Milner court; and regrettably, no
explanation, other than that sketched out by the court above, was given
of the reasoning the court employed to reach its conclusion. So, as yet,
213 403 U.S. at 104. Also, the Griffin Court later cited United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 757-60 & n.17 (1966) and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) when
it again mentioned that the rights of national citizenship were protected from private
interference. 403 U.S. at 106. Significantly, both Guest and Twining listed Waddell as
one of the cases that established a right of national citizenship.
2,4 See notes 70-77 supra and accompanying text.
245 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). Other titles of the
1964 Civil Rights Act could conceivably be utilized as well.
26 The McLellan holding is already in danger of being overruled within its own cir-
cuit; on April 21, 1976, it was scheduled for a rehearing by the Fifth Circuit en banc. See
note 224 infra.
21- 409 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
211 Id. at 1395.
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there is no clear indication that the McLelkn rationale has gained any
support among the federal courts. Some courts however, like the Mil-
ter court, that read the plain words of the statute2' 9 along with the
language in Griffin v. Breckenridge,220 have held the statute is capable
of protecting federal statutory rights. 221 The McLellan rationale should
supply these courts with a convenient means to an already recognized
end. Such an adoption of the McLellan rationale would allow for the
utilization of section 1985(3) by a sex discrimination claimant in at
least the employment area covered by Title VII, 222 as well as open up
broad new areas beyond sex-based discrimination for the statute's use.
V. CONCLUSION
Griffin v. Brecken ridge remains the only modern statement by the
Supreme Court on the reach of section 1985(3). The Griffin Court
rested its extension of section 1985(3) into the private sector exclu-
sively upon two grounds - the thirteenth amendment and the national
citizenship right to travel. On its face, the Griffin decision restricted
the effective utilization of section 1985(3) to the race discrimination
area. As discussed earlier, alternatively basing the authority for the
statute's use upon the fourteenth amendment even further restricts the
statute's reach since state action is required before that amendment
can be invoked. Any potential section 1985(3) has for reaching private
action outside of the race area lies in an exploration of the second con-
219 "If two or more persons ... conspire whereby another is . . .deprived of having
or exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States . . . the party so
deprived may have an action for recovery of damages." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
See note 16 supra for the entire text of the statute.
220 "To come within the legislation a complaint must allege that the defendants did
(1) conspire .. .whereby another was (4b) deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States." Griflin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03
(1971).
221 See Local 1 (ACA), Broadcast Employees of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (rights guaranteed by 29
U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970) held to be protected by section 1985(3)); Clark v. Universal
Builders, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982 (1970) held to be protected by section 1985(3)).
222 The advantages of using section 1985(3) in conjunction with Title VII are many.
All of the rigorous jurisdictional requirements of Title VII, such as the exhaustion of
administrative remedies, can be foregone in a section 1985(3) action; and the remedies
afforded under section 1985(3), unlike Title VII which is limited only to back pay, in-
clude both punitive and conpensatory damages.
Any question that Title VII, with its finely honed procedural requirements, was in-
tended by Congress to be an exclusive remedy was conclusively settled by the Supreme
Court in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) and Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Citing Gardner-Denver the Court in John-
son noted:
Despite Title VII's range and its design as a comprehensive solution for the prob-
lem of invidious discrimination in employment, the aggrieved individual clearly
is not deprived of other remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII in
his search for relief. "(T)he legislative history of Title VII manifests a congres-
sional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both
Title VH and other applicable state and federal statutes." Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. ...
421 U.S. at 459 (citation omitted).
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stitutional ground identified by the Griffin Court - the right to travel,
one of the rights of national citizenship.
A sex discrimination claimant, like all litigants outside of the race
discrimination area, must therefore plead a violation of a right of na-
tional citizenship if he is to ever successfully bring a section 1985(3)
action. Realistically, the only rights of national citizenship available
to such claimants are those recognized by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Waddell.223 As this Note has emphasized, correctly con-
strued, Waddell stands for the proposition that rights granted by federal
statute are rights of national citizenship. The violation of one's federal
statutory rights by private individuals, therefore, is conceivably action-
able under section 1985(3).
Owing to the present makeup of the Supreme Court and the far-
reaching implications of classifying federal statutory rights as rights of
national citizenship, there is little cause to anticipate an immediate ac-
ceptance of the United States v. Waddell interpretation endorsed by
this Note and the Fifth Circuit in McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light
Co0 2 4 The questions raised by McLellan and Waddell, however, will
have to be answered soon. For too long now the rights of national
citizenship have remained little more than constitutional curiosities.
Present litigation under section 1985(3), in time, is going to require the
Supreme Court to explain the modem efficacy of the rights of national
citizenship. Once the question reaches the Court, the issue will likely
narrow to the proper interpretation of the United States v. Waddell
opinion; and if the McLellan construction is adopted, a new chapter of
this country's civil rights litigation could begin.
KEvIN E. IRWIN
2- 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
224 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976) (scheduled for rehearing en banc). While this Note
was being set in print the Fifth Circuit reversed its original decision in McLellan. Mc-
Lellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (1977). The circuit court's opinion
based its reversal upon McLellan's failure to assert a sufficiently class-based animus behind
MPL's actions. The court's opinion, however, substantially undermined the rationale of
the first McLellan decision by its contention, in an advisory section, that a conspiracy
must be violative of some law other than section 1985(3) before a conspiracy can be action-
able under section 1985(3). This novel interpretation of section 1985(3) is highly disturb-
ing. As Judge Godbold pointed out in his erudite dissent to the McLellan reversal, the
interpretation the Fifth Circuit has given section 1985(3) is a manifestation of judicial
distrust of Griffin v. Breckenridge and the potential sweep of section 1985(3); the inter-
pretation cannot be supported by logic or legal precedent.
The only positive aspect of the Fifth Circuit's reversal of McLellan is that the Supreme
Court now has a section 1985(3) case that is ideal for a grant of certiorari. The two
McLeilan decisions taken together present all the salient questions regarding section
1985(3) that have been unresolved since Griffin v. Breckenridge.
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